The effects of oil shocks on output volatility through international transport costs are investigated in an open-economy DSGE model. Two versions of the model, with and without international transport costs, are structurally estimated for the U.S. economy by a Bayesian approach for moving windows of ten years. For model selection, the posterior odds ratios of the two versions are compared for each ten-year window. The version with international transport costs is selected during periods of high volatility in crude oil prices. The contribution of international transport costs to the volatility of U.S. GDP has been estimated as high as 36% during periods of oil crises.
Introduction
shows the relation between the U.S. business cycles and the volatility of crude oil prices for ten-year moving windows. For each ten-year window, the solid line represents the number of NBER recession quarters, and the dashed line represents the coe¢ cient of variation in oil prices. 1 The two series seem to move together with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0.54. This …gure raises the question of whether oil prices have any signi…cant e¤ects on the business cycles. Many earlier studies have attempted to answer this question. Among many others, Kim and Loungani (1992) have shown in a neoclassical model that oil price shocks could explain only a modest component of the variance of U.S. output growth. Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) have suggested in their markup pricing model that a 10% increase in energy prices could lead to a 2.5% drop in output after 6 quarters. Finn (2000) has shown that capital utilization is another channel that would provide similar results as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) . Bernanke et al. (1997) have claimed that changes in oil prices lead the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates (in order to control in ‡ation), which, in turn, cause downturns; hence, monetary policy is another channel through which oil prices can a¤ect the business cycles. Similarly, Kilian (2002, 2004) have argued that a monetary expansion was the cause of much of the 1973-74 oil price increase and the decline in output afterwards. Leduc and Sill (2004) have shown through capital utilization and sticky prices that monetary policy contributes about 40 percent to the drop in output following a rise in oil prices. Hamilton and Herrara (2000) , Dotsey and Reid (1992) , Hoover and Perez (1994) , Ferderer (1996) , Brown and Yücel (1999) , and Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) have all shown empirically that, compared to the monetary policy, the oil prices have been more in ‡uential on the business cycles. Bresnahan and Ramey (1993) , Bohi (1991) , Lee and Ni (2002) , Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) , and Keane and Prasad (1996) have focused on the frictions in reallocating labor or capital across di¤erent sectors that may be di¤erentially a¤ected by an oil shock. This paper mostly belongs to the part of the literature that focuses on the e¤ects of oil price shocks on the business cycles through the CPI in ‡ation rate. As Hamilton (2005) nicely puts, the in ‡ation rate is governed by monetary policy, so, ultimately, this is a question about how the central bank responds to the oil price shock. Hooker (2002) has found evidence that oil shocks made a substantial contribution to U.S. core in ‡ation before 1981 but have made little contribution since, consistent with the conclusion of Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) that U.S. monetary policy has become signi…cantly more devoted to curtailing in ‡ation. Within this picture (i.e., the e¤ects of oil prices on the business cycles through the in ‡ation rate), none of the papers mentioned above have investigated the international-transport-cost channel of oil prices. In particular, in a world where consumer utility depends on domestically-produced goods and internationally-imported goods, the in ‡ation rate depends on the price of domestically-produced goods and the price of internationallyimported goods that includes international transport costs. A natural question arises: What are the e¤ects of oil price shocks on the business cycles through international price di¤erences (i.e., short-term deviations from the Law of One Price) measured by such international transport costs?
This paper attempts to answer this question by estimating two versions of a standard DSGE model, with and without international transport costs, using the U.S. quarterly data. In the version with transport costs, the optimization of individuals and …rms in a ‡exible price equilibrium setup result in having the e¤ects of international transport costs in the IS equation, the Phillips curve, the terms of trade expression, the monetary policy rule, and the CPI in ‡ation rate. The structural estimation is achieved by a Bayesian approach for each ten-year window between 1957-2010 to investigate nonlinearities in the U.S. economy caused by oil price shocks through time. For each ten-year window, the posterior odds ratios of the two versions of the model are compared for model selection. The results suggest that a necessary condition for the version of the model with transport costs to be selected is to have a coe¢ cient of variation in crude oil prices of above 0.25 over a ten-year period. Although the average contribution of international transport costs to the volatility of U.S. GDP is estimated about 3% for the whole sample period, the contribution is up to 36% during periods of oil crises. According to the structural estimation results, the Federal Reserve has used interest rates as a policy tool during periods of oil crises mostly to stabilize output rather than the in ‡ation rate or the interest rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a summary of the model. Section 3 introduces the data and the estimation methodology. Section 4 depicts the estimation results.
Section 5 concludes. The detailed derivation of the model, together with its implications, is given in the Appendices.
Model
The model is a version of Gali and Monacelli (2005) with the addition of international transport costs at the …nal goods level. The model consists of a forward-looking IS-equation and a forwardlooking Phillips curve, together with a monetary policy described by an interest rate rule and a terms-of-trade expression. The detailed derivation of model is given in Appendix A.
The IS curve is given by
where y t is the output, i t is the annual nominal interest rate, H;t is the annual in ‡ation of homeproduced goods, t represents symmetric transport costs on internationally traded (i.e., both exported and imported) …nal goods, E t is the expectation operator, and is the …rst-di¤erence operator.
The Phillips curve is given by
, is the probability that a …rm does not change its price within a given period (i.e., price stickiness), is the discount factor, x t y t z t + t represents the output gap under a ‡exible price equilibrium where z t is the level of technology. As is shown in Appendix B, stabilizing the output gap (the gap between actual and natural output) is not equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap (the gap between actual and e¢ cient output). Hence, there is no divine coincidence in the model of this paper mentioned by Blanchard and Gali (2007) .
The nominal interest rates are determined by a Taylor rule:
where t is the annual consumer price index (CPI) in ‡ation, i captures the degree of interest-rate smoothing, and " t is an exogenous policy shock which can be interpreted as the non-systematic component of monetary policy. The relation between in ‡ation of home-produced goods (i.e., H;t ) and CPI in ‡ation (i.e., t ) is given by:
where is a measure of openness, and s t is the e¤ective terms of trade given by:
where i t is the annual foreign interest rate, and F;t is the annual foreign in ‡ation (through imported goods). Since i t and F;t appear only in the terms of trade expression, we will combine them under a foreign …nancial variable, f t = i t E t F;t+1 .
There are three additional independent shocks considered in the model, namely technology, international transport costs, and foreign …nancial variable:
As is evident, there is no foreign output variable (hence no foreign output shock) in the model.
Instead, as shown in Appendix C, the expected change in foreign output is decomposed into the foreign …nancial variable and transport costs. As discussed in Appendix D, the foreign …nancial variable also captures any international …nancial frictions or shocks between home and foreign countries through the exogenous foreign interest rate. Hence, one may expect to have higher contributions of the foreign …nancial variable and international transport costs on the business cycles, because they may capture such latent variables mentioned above.
As opposed to this paper, many studies have endogenized the deviations from the Law of One price; e.g., Monacelli (2005) we only care about the exogenous e¤ects of oil shocks on the U.S. business cycles.
Data and Estimation Methodology
The open-economy model is estimated using data on the U.S. economy obtained from International Financial Statistics for the quarterly period over 1957:Q1-2010:Q4. The variables are calculated as percentage deviations from their steady-states to take care of any possible stationarity issues.
We use observations on the percentage deviations of real output, CPI in ‡ation, and short-term The estimation is achieved through a Bayesian approach where the choice of priors for the structural parameters plays an important role. detail is that the model is parameterized in terms of the steady-state real interest rate r, rather than the discount factor , where r is annualized such that = exp ( r=400).
The moving-window estimation is achieved for each ten-year period between 1957:Q1-2010:Q4.
To address the question of whether international transport costs are signi…cant in explaining output volatilities, for each ten-year period, two versions of the model, with ( t > 0 for all t) and without ( = 0 for all t) transport costs, are estimated. For model selection, we assess the hypothesis of = 0 against the alternative of t > 0 for all t by computing the posterior odds ratios for each
ten-year period. The reader is referred to Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) for technical details related to the calculation of the posterior odds ratio. Figure 2 shows the selected version of the model (i.e., with or without trade costs) versus the volatility in oil prices for each ten-year period estimated. While the vertical axis on the left shows the volatility in oil prices (measured by the coe¢ cient of variation), the vertical axis on the right shows the selected model by taking a value of 0 for the version of the model with t = 0 and a value of 1 for the version of the model with t > 0. As is evident, the model with positive international transport costs shocks has been selected during periods of high oil price volatility that include the production peak of the U.S. in 1970, the oil crises in 1973 and 1979, the oil glut in 1980s, the 1990 oil price spike occurred in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the 2005 oil price shock. One striking evidence is that a necessary condition for the version of the model with positive international transport costs shocks to be selected is to have a coe¢ cient of variation in crude oil prices above 0.25. Therefore, according to the methodology of this paper and the relation between oil prices and recessions in Figure 1 , the U.S. GDP has been a¤ected by international transport costs during period of high oil price volatility. But, how important are these international transport costs? To answer this question, we calculate the variance decomposition of the U.S. GDP for each ten-year window, below.
Estimation Results

Model Selection
Variance Decomposition of Output
The variance decomposition of the U.S. GDP through the version of the model with international transport costs (i.e., t > 0) is given in Figure 3 . According to this version of the model, on average, about 30% of output volatility is due to transport costs shocks, 47% due to foreign …nancial shocks, 13% due to technology shocks, and 10% due to monetary policy shocks. High contributions of international shocks, namely transport costs and foreign …nancial shocks, are mostly attributable to latent variables of foreign output (see Appendix C) and …nancial frictions (see Appendix D)
that show up under either of these two shocks. One striking evidence is that, during the periods of oil crises, the e¤ect of transport costs falls, and the e¤ects of foreign …nancial and monetary policy shocks increase. Hence, the e¤ects of oil shocks are mostly through international …nancial markets or the monetary policy rather than the direct e¤ects of oil prices on international transport costs.
Another evidence is that technology shocks have a higher contribution on output volatility starting from mid-1980s.
The variance decomposition of the U.S. GDP through the version of the model without international transport costs (i.e., t = 0) is given in Figure 4 . According to this version of the model, on average, 63% of output volatility is due to foreign …nancial shocks, 13% due to technology shocks, and 24% due to monetary policy shocks. Hence, the e¤ect of transport costs on output volatility in the version with transport costs seems to be mostly replaced by either the foreign …nancial variable or the monetary policy in the version without transport costs. During the periods of oil crises, the e¤ect of foreign …nancial shocks seems to be higher. Hence, the e¤ects of oil shocks are mostly through international …nancial markets in this version of the model. As in the model with transport costs, technology shocks have a higher contribution on output volatility starting from mid-1980s.
When we turn back to our question of how important international transport costs are, we combine the variance decompositions of output coming from the two versions of the model. In particular, we know which model is selected by the posterior odds ratio for each ten-year window;
by using the variance decomposition of output obtained from the selected model for each ten-year window, we combine the variance decompositions of output in Figure 5 . As is evident, international transport costs can contribute to the volatility of output up to 36% during the periods of oil crises.
Nevertheless, the average contribution of international transport costs on the volatility of output is about 3% for the whole sample period; this latter result is consistent with Kim and Loungani (1992) who have shown in a neoclassical model that oil price shocks could explain only a modest component of the variance of U.S. output. In sum, although the e¤ect of international transport costs is minimal during non-crisis periods, the U.S. economy has had experienced signi…cant e¤ects of oil prices on its output through international transport costs during the periods of oil crises.
According to the combined variance decomposition of output, on average, the contributions of foreign …nancial variable shock, monetary policy shock, technology shock, and international transport shock are 62%, 23%, 12%, and 3%, respectively, for the whole sample period. Therefore, the direct e¤ects of oil price changes through international transport costs are less than the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks; this result is opposed to studies such as Hamilton that show up under either of these two shocks.
Monetary Policy
The other parameters of the model (i.e., the posterior means as point estimates) have also been obtained through the ten-year window estimations. To save space and focus on the monetary policy through time, we only depict the Taylor rule parameter estimates obtained from the combination of the two versions of the model; i.e., each depicted parameter belongs to the model selected by the posterior odds ratio. The estimates of through time are given in Figure 6 . As is evident, the response of the Federal Reserve to the deviations of in ‡ation from its target value seems to be negatively related to the volatility of crude oil prices; in other words, during the periods of oil crises, the Federal Reserve has given fewer weight to in ‡ation according to our Taylor rule speci…cation. The estimates of x through time are given in Figure 7 . As is evident, the response of the Federal Reserve to the deviations of output from its ‡exible-price-equilibrium value seems to be positively related to the volatility of crude oil prices; hence, during the periods of oil crises, which mostly correspond to the recession periods according to Figure 1 , the Federal Reserve has given more weight to output gap according to our Taylor rule speci…cation. The estimates of i through time are given in Figure 8 where, as one would expect from an active monetary policy, the interest-rate smoothing is fewer during the times of crises. The last three results suggest that the Federal Reserve has used interest rates as a policy tool during oil crises periods mostly to stabilize output rather than the in ‡ation rate or the interest rate; hence, the Federal Reserve has used interest rates as a policy tool during non-crisis periods mostly to stabilize the in ‡ation rate and the interest rate. 
Conclusion
Individuals
The representative individual in the domestic (i.e., home) country has the following intertemporal lifetime utility function:
where U (C t ) is the utility out of consuming a composite index of C t , V (N t ) is the disutility out of working N t hours, and 0 < < 1 is a discount factor. The composite consumption index C t is 2 The model of this paper slightly deviates from Yilmazkuday (2009) by assuming a zero-trend in ‡ation, because all variables are represented as percentage deviations from their steady-states in this paper.
de…ned by:
where C H;t and C F;t are consumption of home and foreign (i.e., imported) goods, respectively, and is the share of domestic consumption allocated to imported goods. These symmetric consumption sub-indexes are de…ned by:
where C H;t (j) and C F;t (j) represent domestic consumption of home and foreign good j, respectively, and > 1 is the price elasticity of demand faced by each monopolist. The optimality conditions result in:
where P H;t (j) and P F;t (j) are prices of domestically consumed home and foreign good j, respectively. P H;t and P F;t are price indexes of domestically consumed home and foreign goods, respectively, which are de…ned as:
and
Similarly, the demand allocation of home and imported goods implies:
where P t = P H;t 1 P F;t is the consumer price index (CPI). The log-linear version of CPI can be written as:
where p H;t and p F;t are logs of P H;t and P F;t , respectively. The (log) price index for imported goods is further given by:
where e t is the (log) nominal e¤ective exchange rate; p F;t is the (log) price index of domestically consumed foreign goods at the source; and t is the (log) gross international transport cost, which is an income received by the rest of the world. 3 The (log) gross international transport cost directly enters the price index for imported goods, because it is assumed that the international transport costs are the same across goods, and they are symmetric. The evolution of international transport costs is given by an AR(1) process:
and " t is assumed to be an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) shock with zero mean and variance 2 .
The (log) e¤ective terms of trade is de…ned as s t p F;t p H;t , which implies that the (log) CPI formula can be written as:
Combining s t p F;t p H;t and p F;t = e t + p F;t + t results in an alternative expression for the (log) e¤ective terms of trade:
s t e t + p F;t + t p H;t (6.13) which includes international transport costs.
The formula of CPI in ‡ation follows as:
where t = p t p t 1 is CPI in ‡ation, and H;t = p H;t p H;t 1 is the in ‡ation of home-produced goods (i.e., home in ‡ation). Combining Equations 6.13 and (6.14) results in an alternative expression of CPI in ‡ation:
which suggests that CPI in ‡ation is a weighted sum of home in ‡ation, foreign in ‡ation, growth in exchange rate, and growth in international transport costs. Hence, international transport costs play an important role in the determination of CPI in ‡ation.
The individual household constraint is given by:
where F t;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor, B t+1 is the nominal payo¤ in period t + 1 of the portfolio held at the end of period t, W t is the hourly wage, and T t is the lump sum transfers/taxes. By using the optimal demand functions, Equation (6.16) can be written in terms of the composite good as follows:
The representative home agent's problem is to choose paths for consumption, portfolio, and the labor supply. Therefore, the representative consumer maximizes her expected utility [equation (6.1)] subject to the budget constraint [equation (6.17)]. The …rst order condition implies that:
] is the gross return on the portfolio. Equation (6.18) represents the traditional intertemporal Euler equation for total real consumption. The labor supply decision of the individual is obtained as follows:
The problem is analogous for the rest of the world: Euler equation for the rest of the world is given by:
where t is the nominal e¤ective exchange rate. Combining Equations (6.18) and (6.20) , together with assuming U (C t ) = log C t , one can obtain:
for all t, where Q t = t P t =P t is the real e¤ective exchange rate; thus, the (log) e¤ective real exchange rate is obtained as:
By using Equations (6.9), (6.10) and (6.13), together with the symmetric versions of Equations (6.9) and (6.10) for the rest of the world, we can rewrite Equation (6.22) as follows:
where is the share of foreign consumption allocated to goods imported from the home country.
Under the assumption of complete international …nancial markets, by combining log-linearized version of Equations (6.18), (6.20) and (6.21), together with Equation (6.22), the uncovered interest parity condition is obtained as:
is the foreign interest rate. This uncovered interest parity condition relates the movements of the interest rate di¤erentials to the expected variations in the e¤ective nominal exchange rate. Since s t e t + p F;t + t p H;t according to Equation (6.13), we can rewrite Equation (6.24) as follows:
where t+1 is the change in trade cost from period t to t + 1. Equation (6.25) shows the terms of trade between the home country and the rest of the world as a function of current interest rate di¤erentials, expected future home in ‡ation di¤erentials and its own expectation for the next period together with the expected future change in trade cost. Here, the evolution of foreign interest rate shock is given by:
where i 2 [0; 1], and " i t is assumed to be an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) shock with zero mean and variance 2 i .
Firms
The representative domestic …rm has the following production function:
where Z t is an exogenous economy-wide productivity parameter; and N t is labor input. Accordingly, the marginal cost of production is given by:
where ! is the employment subsidy. The inclusion of this subsidy is not arbitrary, because as discussed below, under the assumption of a constant employment subsidy ! that neutralizes the distortion associated with …rms'market power, it can be shown that the optimal monetary policy is the one that replicates the ‡exible price equilibrium allocation in a closed economy.
Using Equation (6.19) , together with assuming V (N t ) = N t , the log-linearized real marginal cost can be written as follows: 4
Moreover, if the aggregate output in the home country is de…ned as
labor market equilibrium implies:
Yt dj of which equilibrium variations can be shown to be of second-order in log terms. Thus, in …rst-order log-linearized terms, we can write:
where z t evolves according to:
where z 2 [0; 1] and " z t is assumed to be an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and variance 2 z .
Market Clearing
For all di¤erentiated goods, market clearing implies:
Y t (j) = C H;t (j) + C H;t (j) (6.33) 4 Balanced growth requires the relative risk aversion in consumption to be unity, and thus we set U (C) = log C . Following the lead of Hansen (1985) , we also assume that labor is indivisible, implying that the representative agent's utility is linear in labor hours so that V (N ) = N .
where C A H;t = C H;t + C H;t is the aggregate world demand for the goods produced in the home country. Using Equation (6.7) and the symmetric version of Equation (6.8) for the rest of the world, Equation (6.34) can be rewritten as follows:
, one can write:
which implies that Equation (6.35) can be rewritten as follows:
Log-linearizing Equation (6.36) around the steady-state, together with using s t p F;t p H;t and Equation (6.23), will transform it to the following expression:
Also using Equation (6.14) and the log-linearized version of Equation (6.18) (i.e., Euler), Equation (6.38) can be rewritten as follows:
which represents an IS curve that considers the e¤ect of international transport costs on output, which is not the usual case in the literature where the last term (i.e., the expected change in international transport costs) is absent. From another point of view, Equation (6.39) represents an IS curve that relates the expected change in (log) output (i.e., E t (y t+1 ) y t ) to the di¤erence between the interest rate, the expected future domestic in ‡ation (i.e., an approximate measure of real interest rate that becomes an exact measure of real interest rate when the terms of trade are constant across periods), and the expected change in international transport costs. 5 An increase in the di¤erence between the expected in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate decreases the expected change in the output gap, with a unit coe¢ cient. Finally, an expected increase in the international transport costs leads to a decrease in the expected change in (log) output. The latter is due to the intertemporal substitution of supply in response to a change in international transport costs.
The model employs a Calvo price-setting process, in which producers are able to change their prices only with some probability, independently of other producers and the time elapsed since the last adjustment. It is assumed that producers behave as monopolistic competitors. Accordingly, each producer faces the following demand function:
where C A H;t = C H;t + C H;t is the aggregate world demand for the goods produced. Note that this expression is the same with Equation (6.34).
Assuming that each producer is free to set a new price at period t, the objective function can be written as:
where e P H;t is the new price chosen in period t, and is the probability that producers maintain the same price of the previous period. The problem of producers is to maximize equation (6.41) subject to Equation (6.40). The …rst order necessary condition of the …rm for this maximization is:
is a markup as a result of market power. Using Equation (6.18), we can rewrite Equation (6.42) as follows: In equilibrium, each producer that chooses a new price in period t will choose the same price and the same level of output. Then the (aggregate) price of domestic goods will obey:
which can be log-linearized as follows:
Finally, by combining Equations (6.45) and (6.47), we obtain the New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
where x = (1 )(1 ) .
Equilibrium Dynamics
Combining Equations (6.29) and (6.38) leads to an expression for real marginal cost in terms of output:
By using the symmetric version of Equation (6.38) for the rest of the world, namely y t = c t + s t t , together with Equations (6.23) and (6.21), one can obtain:
As discussed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) , under the assumption of a constant employment subsidy ! that neutralizes the distortion associated with …rms'market power, it can be shown that the optimal monetary policy is the one that replicates the ‡exible price equilibrium allocation in a closed economy. That policy requires that real marginal costs (and thus mark-ups) are stabilized at their steady state level, which in turn implies that domestic prices be fully stabilized. However, as shown by Gali and Monacelli (2005) , there is an additional source of distortion in open economy models: the possibility of in ‡uencing the terms of trade in a way bene…cial to domestic consumers.
Nevertheless, an employment subsidy can be found that exactly o¤sets the combined e¤ects of market power and the terms of trade distortions, thus rendering the ‡exible price equilibrium allocation optimal. In order to show this, consider the optimal allocation from the social planner's point of view: maximize Equation (6.1) subject to Equations (6.27), (6.30), (6.36) and (6.37). This optimization results in a constant level of employment, N t = 1, which is the …rst-best employment.
On the other hand, as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) , ‡exible price equilibrium satis…es:
where M C t stands for real marginal cost at ‡exible price equilibrium. If Equations (6.19), (6.28), (6.51) are combined with the optimal allocation of the social planner's problem (i.e., N t = 1), one can obtain:
which suggests that an employment subsidy can be found that exactly o¤sets the combined e¤ects of market power and the terms of trade distortions.
After de…ning domestic natural level of output as the one satisfying ‡exible price equilibrium (i.e., Equation (6.49) with mc t = log ), it can be written as follows:
which can be rewritten by using Equation (6.52) as follows:
which suggests that the domestic natural level of output is negatively a¤ected by international transport costs. This is mostly due to the allocation of some resources to the international transport costs.
Output gap can be de…ned as the deviation of (log) domestic output (i.e., y t ) from domestic natural level of output as follows:
x t = y t y t (6.55)
Using Equation (6.49), one can also write the (log) deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state in terms of output gap as c mc t = x t , which implies that the New-Keynesian Phillips curve can be written in terms of output gap as follows:
Appendix B: Divine Coincidence
Blanchard and Gali (2007) have shown that when the gap between the natural level of output and the e¢ cient (…rst-best) level of output is constant and invariant to shocks, stabilizing the output gap (the gap between actual and natural output) is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap (the gap between actual and e¢ cient output). This equivalence is the source of the divine coincidence: The NKPC implies that stabilization of in ‡ation is consistent with stabilization of the output gap.
This section shows that there is no divine coincidence in the model of this paper. To see this, recall that N t = 1 (i.e., n t = 0) is the …rst-best allocation. Hence, under the …rst-best allocation, according to Equation 6.31, the …rst-best output would be given by:
According to the ‡exible price equilibrium (i.e., the second-best allocation), it has been shown above that the second-best output is given by Equation 6.54:
Hence, the di¤erence between the …rst-best output and the second-best output is given by:
which is not invariant to shocks; i.e., stabilizing the output gap (the gap between actual and natural output) is not equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap (the gap between actual and e¢ cient output). Hence, there is no divine coincidence in the model of this paper.
Appendix C: Foreign Output
Combining Equations 6.25, 6.39 and 6.50 results in an IS equation for the foreign country:
which is an expression for foreign output. Therefore, by considering shocks in the foreign …nancial variable f t = i t E t F;t+1 and transport costs t , compared to earlier studies, the analysis of this paper decomposes the e¤ects of foreign output shocks into foreign …nancial and transport costs shocks. When the version of the model with transport costs is considered, the e¤ects of foreign output is expected to show up under either the foreign …nancial variable or transport costs, and when the version of the model without transport costs is considered, the e¤ects of foreign output is expected to show up under the foreign …nancial variable.
Appendix D: Financial Frictions
If we remove the assumption of complete international …nancial markets, Euler equations for home and foreign countries (i.e., Equations 6.18 and 6.20) will not have the same right hand sides anymore; instead, the gross returns on the portfolios will be di¤erent from each other between the two countries. Such a …nancial friction would further appear in the uncovered interest parity (i.e., Equation 6.24). However, since we already assume that the foreign interest rate is determined through exogenous shocks, any …nancial friction or shock would be a part of the foreign interest rate shock as well. 
Figure 1 -Volatility of Oil Prices versus the Number of Recession Quarters
Notes: For each ten-year window, the dashed line and the vertical axis on the left represent the coefficient of variation for crude oil prices. For each ten-year window, the solid line and the vertical axis on the right represent the number of recession quarters according to NBER.
Figure 2 -Volatility of Oil Prices versus the Selected Model
Notes: For each ten-year window, the dashed line and the vertical axis on the left represent the coefficient of variation for crude oil prices. For each ten-year window, the solid line and the vertical axis on the right represent the selected version of the model; 1 represents the version with international transport costs, and 0 represents the version without transport costs. 
